19 research outputs found
Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs
In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in
generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing
literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric
belief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novel
mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate
negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative
valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to
mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we
adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN
mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project
based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a
reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum
mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding
which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx
and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards
the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief.
Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is
provisioned at equilibrium.Comment: Accepted as full paper in IJCAI 201